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Date: Jul 26, 2017 at 10:57 AM
Subject: 2018-2020 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STRATEGY 却+너 穉景魚壽 馮獸襪 譚 晁 錮 鐳 跡 布

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– CBS BRIEFING –

2018-2020 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STRATEGY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

This analysis has been authored by Liz Gallagher, outgoing Climate Briefing Service (CBS) Director. It could not have been written without the confidential input of many non-governmental experts and serving officials that engage on international climate politics. It has been strongly informed by the insights and expertise from the global team of CBS.

PURPOSE

Since Paris, the key thought leaders and practitioners have frequently gathered to work through what can be expected from this new post-Paris chapter. This proposition aims to articulate and codify some of these rich discussions into a simple, long-awaited political strategy. It focuses on the 'what' not the 'how'. Not all organisations and individuals will agree entirely with these priorities and outcomes, as such this proposition is one offering.

BOUNDARIES

There are many elements of climate action defined as 'international'. In order to draw a clear line, this proposition focuses on how to use the international drumbeat (ambition mechanism) that Paris defined to help deliver collective ambition.

Whilst the connections between other agendas like finance, transport and biodiversity are important, these are well established and as such will not be the focus of this proposition. The 'international' for our purposes will include:

International talks in 2020 – culminating in UNFCCC, but will draw upon Agenda 2030 and the Conference for Biological Diversity (CBD)

Major plurilateral meetings like G7 and G20

Bilateral/regional meetings between leaders

THE CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITIES

Whilst 2020 is the culmination of this new chapter, the beginning will take place in 2018. Global emissions peaking by 2020 demands pushing on every door by everyone. The Paris Agreement is an effective lever to wedge open the door, it has political traction. But this new chapter is different to the last. **The politics of regime building we undertook ahead of Paris are fundamentally different to the politics of ambition we face now.** 2020 is multi-faceted – it is not just about targets, timetables or text. The regime is in place – this new chapter is about **connecting reality on the ground to the politics and strengthening the regime to reinforce collective ambition.** This new chapter will be defined by:

Containment versus Ambition – despite the strength and resilience of political support, the Paris Agreement is still vulnerable and demands our attention to defend and uphold it. However, demonstrating the logic of the Paris Agreement is key to its long-term defence. It is, therefore, essential to create a reinforcing cycle in which change on the ground builds confidence and results in new collective commitments.

Deeper advocacy – whilst keeping climate change on the radar of world leaders will be important for political momentum, many of the daily decisions will fall into the hands of unelected bureaucrats. Inertia and resistance from unelected technocrats will become a significant hurdle. Influencing these constituencies is challenging and requires a step change in how non-state actors interact with officials and leaders to help deliver accountability and action.

Climate as mainstream versus climate as by-product - in many countries and across many plurilateral venues climate is shaping, not chasing the geopolitical priorities. In some developed countries, like Germany, US, France and Poland, it is becoming a (sometimes divisive) political issue. This has benefits as it can elevate the debate, but it can reinforce the more abstract and intangible nature of the agenda. The politics of populism means we must relate climate to everyday lives, while keeping it at the top table, where it deserves attention.

Known unknowns – the Paris Agreement and the new chapter we face open up a Pandora's box of challenges. We are only managing a third of the climate challenge. We can no longer ignore some of the security and governance risks of climate impacts or the potential for crash mitigation approaches. The international governance systems are not fit for purpose to address these issues which are becoming more probable and intense. In addition, the reactions by different actors to these issues also has the potential to divide and create opposition within our community.

No one in charge – whilst the US federal government did not singlehandedly deliver the Paris Agreement, they did take responsibility for delivering much of the climate diplomacy choreography required to attain success. Whilst new leaders are emerging, there is no single leader helping to choreograph success in 2020, as such higher transaction costs will result from a more distributed leadership.

Democratise the details – the rules that govern the Paris Agreement will need to be in good part developed by 2018. To ensure honest, as opposed to creative accounting, these decisions must be democratised, taken out of the hands of bureaucrats and governments, leveraging the wealth of experience of non-state actors.

Trump second term – many within the climate leadership community have priced President Trump into what they expect for 2020. In addition, much of the roll backs that President Trump has induced will not take effect until 2025. As such, the psychological blow to global climate confidence of President Trump winning a second term is highly problematic and will require significant contingency planning by the global climate community.

Fragmented and diverse actors - importantly, one of the biggest changes is that after Paris, the climate community has reverted to business as usual and is more fragmented as a result. This proposal aims to provide a common thread to harness our collective activity, augment it and channel it to achieve political change.

WHAT'S AT STAKE?

2020 is make or break for the Paris Agreement – it is the real moment of truth when investors and business will judge the sincerity of countries' commitments made in 2015. 2020 will help to build resilience into the fragile but mutually reinforcing momentum between government signals and action by business and investors.

Paris proved that when the political conditions are right, international climate diplomacy can create a powerful ambition dynamic that raises the bar for everyone as countries step forward together. **Whilst 2020 is the end point of this new chapter, the beginning is 2018**, when a range of international events align to create a sense of urgency and confidence in delivery.

This new chapter is also a moment to get serious about the 'known unknowns' of climate change. By 2020 we can **no longer ignore the non-linear and disruptive nature of climate impacts and climate policy**. Without effective governance reforms, these issues can be misappropriated by populist and incumbent forces risking peace and stability.

If no active political alignment and momentum is channelled ahead of 2020:

International leaders won't feel pressure or have political cover to step forward together to make clear progress.

Incumbent forces will work to unravel the universality of the Paris Agreement and it will stop being an effective lever for change domestically.

The investments and resources currently deployed amongst non-state actors and civil society will not be channelled into political change and ambition.

Progress made on the ground will not be captured and reinforce confidence amongst governments to continue to raise ambition.

FRAMING 2020

Underpinning a winning strategy is a new frame. This new frame upgrades the level of complexity in how we manage a global conversation on the challenge and the solutions. This needs to complement and build on the Paris narrative that climate action makes economic sense, but it must go one step further. It must focus on the social dimensions and benefits of climate action. Climate action must be seen as the by-product of the reforms citizens care about. And critically, the story must move beyond the benefits of action, towards the consequences of inaction, making climate impacts relevant to daily lives.

An important component of this new chapter should help create confidence in the disruptive potential of climate impacts and solutions. Moving from incremental towards transformational mind-sets will be vital to ensure ambitious decision-making. And finally, we should cement the multi-layered complexity of international climate action – no longer is this the domain of governments. All parts of society must lead – from individuals, cities, companies, investors and governments.

WHAT CAN BE GAINED BY 2020?

The richness and complexity of what needs to be achieved by 2020 has been captured, synthesised and focused into the key priorities that can guide our collective work. There are two main goals for 2020.

1. Group of developed and developing countries from the G20, progressive governments and non-state actors feel confident to step forward together to enhance ambition to keep on track to deliver Paris.

Not all countries will want to or be able to step forward on ambition. But by 2020, if additional political momentum is actioned, it will be possible to quantify emissions reductions by a critical mass of countries, but this will not and should not be the whole story of 2020.

If successful, 2020 should also mark a turning point in structural change in the global economy in key sectors – a factor that is difficult to quantify. For example, carbon risk pricing on new infrastructure. It is also important that countries take the next step in making Paris a reality by undertaking 2050 plans that cement a layer of confidence into the investment community and spur on national and sectoral transformation. Again, this is a challenge to quantify.

By 2020, we still will not have closed the gigatonne gap, but we must be able to demonstrate **quantifiable difference between promises in 2015 and the reality in 2020/2030, complemented by demonstrating structural change in the economy**. This means **1.5°C must still be possible and 2°C more probable, though not necessarily secured**^[1].

Importantly, what counts as 'ambition' by 2020 is that it can both be quantifiable and qualitative but crucially it must be **new and additional to the promises made in 2015 and countries NDCs**.

Framing these new and additional promises as benefits can help to bring the reality of these promises to life and resonate beyond the climate community. For example: energy bill savings pledges; green spaces coalition; efficient public transport; energy independence; access to sustainable energy promises; saving our harvests pledges; save the Arctic etc.

QUANTIFIABLE: Not all actors signed up to Paris will do more than their Paris commitments. However, some countries and non-state actors can do more without significant real-economy effort – for example, they may have announced additional policies not captured in their 2015 NDCs. Whilst this may look simple on the surface, persuading these countries to rebase their NDCs to reflect the reality of what the atmosphere sees is not going to be easy. Governments like to give themselves a flexibility and not tighten the ratchet too much, as such **this approach requires significant diplomatic choreography**. Some (non-exhaustive) examples of these policies could include:

Coverage – Non-CO2 gases like HFCs phase down, methane emissions reductions, black carbon reduction measures

Sectoral targets such as deforestation, coal phase down deadlines, soil degradation reductions

Additional climate finance contributions by a range of actors, including but beyond developed countries

Honesty in accounting – ensuring that credible and robust accounting standards are clear and implemented

QUALITATIVE: many of the substantive decisions required to be compatible with the Paris Agreement may not be sufficiently mature or quantifiable by 2020. However, capturing these is vital as it reinforces confidence in the political and real-economy momentum by investors and business. Some (non-exhaustive) examples of these policies could include:

Internalising Paris – for example 2050 plans can help governments to comprehend how to reorient their economies towards sustainable development, carbon pricing; disclosure of climate risk; greening portfolios by MDBs
Long-term targets demonstrating structural reform – for example 100% RES by 2050.

2. Robust governance reforms address ‘known unknowns’ of climate action and impacts and spur on urgency agenda

At present, at the international level, we only manage around a third of the climate challenge. The discussions on mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector are mature, whilst taking action on other sectors like agriculture or addressing unmanageable climate impacts is far more complex and often marginalised. Endeavours are being channelled into addressing ‘crash’ mitigation governance, but frighteningly, our approach to addressing the impacts of climate change is undervalued and immature. This is in stark contrast to the gravity of such impacts, the rising probabilities of them taking place as emissions do not decline rapidly enough and as [climate sensitivity becomes more fragile](#).

If these issues are continuously side-lined and unmanaged by the international climate community, they can be **hijacked by our opposition** and we risk dividing the unity and momentum built up around ambition through our ignorance and polarised positions on controversial issues like negative emissions. Constructing the political conditions for mitigation success could be impossible when **radicalised and polarised voices** of allies are raised. Decarbonising could be compromised as the political bandwidth to deal with [multiple compound resource shocks](#), now becoming a likely reality in future, is reduced.

What’s more, communicating the costs of inaction and the various ‘known unknowns’ can act as a **significant catalyst on ambition, refreshing the call for urgency**, ensuring our political and economic leaders understand the gravity of the challenge as opposed to the economic costs and opportunities. In particular, **unveiling where the burden of risks associated with climate impacts fall, can animate greater accountability** between citizens and their local and national governments, consumers and companies.

By 2020 we will need to have created the political demand to address and manage ‘known unknowns’, for example, knowing who to mobilise, what to ask for, when and where to do so and how. This issue must evolve and become more mature, as such a phased approach is more desirable.

The first phase is to identify the risks and increase the literacy amongst the international climate community on the risks and possible solutions, for example, risks could include: the tensions between food security, crash mitigation approaches and biodiversity; addressing how we identify, monitor and manage tipping points and compound resource risks; addressing some of the legal and governance uncertainties regarding supply chain risks; loss and damage etc.

Ultimately, addressing the global aspects of this challenge is a decision to reach consensus at the United Nations – including the UN Security Council, but also other plurilateral peace and security institutions. **Creating the demand for such reform** requires the following:

- Ensuring sound analytical evidence base on these issues – identifying the risk probability and understanding who is being burdened with the risk can help to provide agency to new constituencies
- Engaging climate impacted sectors to improve literacy and political agency to become stronger forces for ambition and actions
- Ensuring well informed governance reform proposals manage disruptive change

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN IN PRACTICE?

Countries^[2]

The Paris Agreement demonstrated that when a handful of countries step forward together, others follow, creating a critical mass. Understanding which countries can trigger and multiply others matters. The selection criteria can include those where political influencing machinery exists; their ease/ability to do more; sectoral heavyweights; diplomatic must haves; hosting Presidencies; potential disruptive threat.

Priority countries are the ‘usual’ suspects with **France; Germany; India; China; Brazil; and the US**. However, in addition to these countries **UK; Argentina; Mexico; South Africa; Indonesia; Saudi; Japan; and Canada**, have qualities that can help lift collective ambition.

There are other coalitions of countries like the **High Ambition Coalition and the Climate Vulnerable Forum** that act as a surging force for ambition that require support to be fit for purpose to address the challenges of the new chapter.

These countries are particularly important to the first goal outlined in the political strategy. The governance reform to address some of the major risks associated with climate action and impacts will demand country support, a detailed agenda for action will crystallise as the political strategy matures.

Sequencing and Alignment

There are a number of opportunities and risks in this new chapter (see Figure 1). In particular, the Presidencies of both the G20 and G7 are held by Saudi Arabia and the US respectively. From 2018-2020 key elections will take place and could have implications for the national interest debate on climate change ahead of 2020. **What is evident is that 2018 is building up to be a critical year in kick starting the politics of 2020.** The California Summit for non-state actors; the IPCC 1.5 Assessment; the Climate Vulnerable Forum Summit and the Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 all help to provide moments to galvanise momentum.

These moments must be shared if 2020 is to deliver robust outcomes. As the international climate community becomes more diverse and fragmented, **coming together around key moments will help connect the reality on the ground to the politics** and keep up that reinforcing momentum that builds confidence amongst our leaders, investors and business.

The sequencing and choreography of how to achieve 2020 must begin now. The crucial dynamic is to create a vanguard of actors that are willing to do more, and invite governments to support them. **Setting up this conditionality helps to keep pressure on governments, but demonstrates momentum and intent by non-state actors and vulnerable countries.**

Figure 1.

The major milestones and evolution of the efforts could include:

KEEPING THE PROCESS ON TRACK – the Paris Agreement established a set of moments and processes that help keep up the drumbeat for ambition. It is crucial these are not degraded. As such, working to secure a creative and effective Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 and ensure a solid, honest foundation for the Paris rulebook will underpin the potential for success in 2020.

URGENCY AND ACCELERATION – it is likely, based on previous years, that early iterations of the IPCC 1.5 review could be unveiled earlier than the official dates. The 1.5 analysis will be challenging to the climate community – preparation will be crucial to ensuring a well-informed discussion that does not result in despair and fatalism. Complementing this analysis alongside evidence demonstrating the non-linear potential of the low carbon economy can help to build confidence in transformational, as opposed to incremental change. **This is the moment to create greater demand for ensuring that the international regime is fit to address the disruptive risks associated with climate change.**

HEROES AND STORYTELLING – the California and Climate Vulnerable Summits offer incredible opportunity for state and non-state actors to outline their intent to do more by 2020 and put the challenge back to national governments. The Summit framing could emphasise that **whilst non-state actors (NSAs) can and will to do more, they can only deliver the full ambition of the Paris Agreement with the aid of central government intent, policy and action.** The Summit can help to celebrate the success and strength of non-state actors, by looking at past successes and what the future may hold, bringing this to life in stories that have meaning to everyday lives. In addition, the summit can work to **increase their credibility to be an effective challenge function to national governments** to help accelerate the scale and speed of climate action in light of the urgent science.

TURNING NSA INTENT INTO POLITICS – the momentum will need to be captured and harnessed. In 2014, this was the responsibility of the UNSG, President Hollande and President Obama. Who precisely will lead such an endeavor is not clear, but harnessing this enthusiasm will be essential. This could take various approaches through leaders' level dialogues; real-economy groups working together to advance 'saving our harvest' etc. In addition, working within the formal structure to use the Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 as the place to celebrate action, take stock of progress and a space for **countries to outline their intent to do more by 2020.**

TACKLING THE WHOLE PROBLEM – in 2019 the UNSG will host a Climate Summit. This Summit will be an important milestone to ensure political momentum is maintained between 2018 and 2020. Crucially, the UNSG can deploy this summit to make the concrete links between the Agenda 2030 which will be subject to review in 2020; the Conference of Biological Diversity (CBD) hosted by China in 2020, and making new pledges on protecting biodiversity; and the UNFCCC in 2020. Big initiatives that work towards solving these interlinked crises can both boost confidence in the Paris Agreement, but importantly relate climate ambition back to everyday lives. **The Summit will also be an important moment for the UN system to outline how it will address some of the challenges arising from extreme climate action and impacts.** The Summit should send a strong signal that no longer will issues affecting fairness, equity, impacts and non-energy mitigation be ignored.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ACTION – governments respond to the calls and the interpretation of 2020 is that it is closing the gap on the Paris long-term goals and managing the full spectrum of risks associated with climate change.

CONCLUSION

The international community is not yet sufficiently prepared to address this new chapter. Now President Trump has stated his intent to pull out of the Paris Agreement, the community can now begin to plan for the future.

Some elements of the political strategy have implications upon the current modus operandi of the international climate community, both state and non-state actors.

Celebrating diversity and aligning around key moments will aggregate the incredible diversity of the climate movement and attempt to channel it into political change.

New investments in compelling evidence is required to help create confidence in non-linear potential growth in decarbonisation as well as increase the creativity of strategic communications to relate climate change to everyday lives.

The international community will need to become increasingly literate on agendas that it has only part-embraced such as like agriculture and international crisis management – in order to address the entirety of the challenge at hand.

Finally, the diversity and complexity of our community and the sophistication of our opposition and incumbents will demand more advocacy and outreach capacity by all involved. Additional agency and activism is demanded by the challenge ahead.

[1] Initial analysis suggests this is still possible (this analysis is not publically available), but the probabilities of meeting these goals without crash mitigation techniques are still not sufficiently forecast.

[2] Extensive mapping (not publically available) has occurred to inform the judgements made regarding priority countries.

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